

Why is this not an issue for us, humans?

# **Agent-based Modeling**



### 1. Rational speech act

Literal and pragmatic speakers and listeners, Bayesian inference

### 2. Interactive alignment


Mutual priming, battle of the Alexas

#### 3. Communicative obstacles

Interpersonal asymmetry, signal ambiguity, typological inadequacy

#### Literal speaker, SO


**Speaker:** Imagine you are talking to someone and you want to refer to the middle object. Which word would you use, "blue" or "circle"?



**Predicting Pragmatic Reasoning** in Language Games


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


Michael C. Frank\* and Noah D. Goodman


#### Literal listener, LO




#### Literal listener, LO



#### Pragmatic speaker, S1




#### Pragmatic speaker, S1




#### Pragmatic listener, L1

Listener/Salience: Imagine someone is talking to you and uses [the word "blue"/a word you don't know] to refer to one of these objects. Which object are they talking about?



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#### **Bayesian inference**


Likelihood speaker s would utter word w to refer to object r

Prior probability that object *r* would be referred to


$$P(r_{
m S}|w,C) = rac{P(w|r_{
m S},C)P(r_{
m S})}{\sum P(w|r',C)P(r')}$$

Likelihood that speaker *s* intended object *r* given uttered word *w* in context *C* 


Normalizing constant, sum of the above computed for all referents in the context



LO correctly interprets the composite signal as referring to the blue square



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




- .5<sub>/1</sub> .5<sub>/.5</sub> 0 .5<sub>/.5</sub>
- 1 .5 .5










.5 <sub>/1.5</sub>	1 <sub>/1.5</sub>	0	1.5 listener's perspective
.5 <sub>/1.5</sub>	0	1 <sub>/1.5</sub>	perspective 1.5





.33	.66	0
.33	0	.66

.66 .66 .66



L1 cannot reliably distinguish between the three referents





listener's perspective

L1 selects a non-intended referent

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
Mutual priming, battle of the Alexas

#### 3. Communicative obstacles

Interpersonal asymmetry, signal ambiguity, typological inadequacy



#### **Mutual priming**



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
Simon Garrod

University of Glasgow, Department of Psychology, Glasgow G12 8QT, United Kingdom.

Toward a mechanistic psychology

of dialogue Priming would require perfect symmetry

#### **Battle of the Alexas**



Even perfect symmetry does not yield automatic understanding



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# Fundamental communicative obstacles Interpersonal asymmetry



No two people have exactly the same experience and expertise



# Fundamental communicative obstacles Signal ambiguity

- Inexactness, open to more than one interpretation
- •For example, a reflexive vs. an embarrassed cough, "the bark was painful", "it's hard to give a good presentation"

## Fundamental communicative obstacles Typological inadequacy

- •Stereotyped dependencies between words and meanings can help communication but do not give the full meaning, e.g., "John dressed and had a bath"
- •A communicator always needs to decide how to make an utterance that will be interpreted as intended in the current context

"There is not much dependence to be placed upon these Constructions that we put upon Signs and Words, which we understand but very little of, & at best can only give a probable Guess at their Meaning."

-- David Samwell, ship surgeon on James Cook's HMS Discovery, Hawaii, 1779

Signal types only give a probable guess at a signal's meaning

- •Rational, probabilistic approaches can provide a measure of a word's uncertainty given the "context" (set of possible signals and referents)
- However, it is unclear how they could overcome fundamental communicative obstacles



• Dual 1: Big Brains